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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over final orders or judgments rendered in the 
Utah State District Courts pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j)(1992). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the district court rule correctly that Utah R. Civ. P. 58A does not require 
Defendants to give Plaintiffs notice of the signing and entry of the order? 
Because the trial court's ruling on this issue is strictly a legal conclusion, 
this court should accord it no difference, and should apply a "correction of error" 
standard of review. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
2. Did the district court rule correctly that Rule 4-504(4) of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration does not require Defendants to give Plaintiffs notice of the 
signing or entry of the order. 
Because the trial court's ruling on this issue is strictly a legal conclusion, 
this court should accord it no difference, and should apply a "correction of error" 
standard of review. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
3. Did the district court rule correctly that a party's failure to provide notice of 
entry of order and failure to file proof of service does not toll the effective date of the 
judgment until actual notice is received by the opposing party? 
Because the trial court's ruling on this issue is based upon stipulated facts, those 
facts are treated as conclusions of law. Zions First National Bank v. National American 
Title Ins,, 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988). 
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III. APPLICABLE STATUTES 
1. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58A. See infra Addendum. 
2. Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504(4). Id. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the district court's Order denying Plaintiffs Motion for 
Relief from Judgment. CR. 183. Plaintiffs made claim against the State of Utah 
and the action was dismissed by stipulation, but Defendants failed to notify Plaintiffs of 
the entry of the order and the question was whether this is sufficient basis for tolling the 
order's effective date so that Plaintiffs may refile their complaint and a bond within the 
one year statute of limitations. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
1. On January 29, 1988, David W. Rounds was killed and Dylan Rounds was 
injured in an automobile collision on Utah State Route 30 in Cache County, Utah. See, 
Court Record ("hereinafter CR."), 2. 
2. On Monday, January 30, 1989, Plaintiffs, Janice Rounds, the surviving spouse 
and Dylan Rounds, minor son of said decedent, and Dylan Rounds, in his individual 
capacity, made claim against the State of Utah and the Utah Department of 
Transportation for the wrongful death of David W. Rounds and for personal injuries 
sustained by Dylan Rounds. CR. 2 at 1f4; CR. 138. 
3. Thereafter, this action was commenced in the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, for damages sustained by Plaintiffs as a consequence of said 
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automobile collision and based on the dangerous and defective condition of said highway 
and the negligent acts and omissions of agents and employees of the Defendants. CR 2. 
4. The Complaint was filed in this matter on April 30, 1990. CR. 2 
5. After the parties engaged in discovery, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss 
the case on June 28, 1991. CR. 102. 
6. The Court's Order dismissing this action without Prejudice was entered on 
September 16, 1991. CR. 118. 
7. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order on January 15, 
1993. CR. 120. 
8. Defendants filed an Opposition to said Motion on January 27, 1993. CR. 155. 
9. Plaintiffs filed a Reply Memorandum on February 16, 1993. CR. 169. 
10. The District Court issued a Minute Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Relief from Judgment or Order on February 22, 1993, stating the Motion was denied for 
the reasons set forth in Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion. 
CR. 179. 
11. The Court's Order was entered on March 9, 1993. CR. 183. 
12. Plaintiffs filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the Court's final Order on 
April 5, 1993. CR. 185. 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about the 20th day of August, 1990, Defendants filed their Answer and 
Jury Demand and thereafter filed an Amended Answer and Jury Demand. CR. 9. On or 
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about the 25th day of July, 1991, Defendants filed and served their Second Amended 
Answer and Jury Demand. CR. 14. 
2. Between the date this action was filed and the date it was dismissed, as 
hereinafter described, both parties conducted discovery. See, CR. 41-62. 
3. On or about June 28, 1991, Defendant, State of Utah, moved to dismiss this 
action because Plaintiffs had "failed to file an undertaking in compliance with Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-19." CR. 102. 
4. Prior to September 3, 1991, Plaintiffs' counsel communicated by telephone with 
Defendants' counsel and the parties agreed, in principle, to stipulate to a dismissal of the 
action without prejudice. CR. 140 at 11 9. 
5. On September 3, 1991, Defendants' counsel caused to be delivered to 
Plaintiffs' counsel a proposed Stipulation and Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice for 
approval as to form. CR. 144. The proposed Stipulation was accompanied by a letter of 
transmittal. CR. 147. 
6. Plaintiffs' counsel declined to approve said proposed Stipulation and Order as 
to form and, on September 4, 1991, mailed to Defendants' counsel a revised Stipulation 
and Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice for his consideration and approval as to form. 
CR. 148. A letter of transmittal of Plaintiffs' counsel was attached thereto. CR. 150. 
7. In a letter of transmittal to Defendants' counsel as aforesaid, Plaintiffs' counsel 
stated: 
If you are in agreement with the changes, please present the 
Order to the Court for signing and entry and provide me with 
an executed copy thereof. 
4 
CR. 150 (emphasis added).1 
8. Defendants' counsel did not, thereafter, correspond or otherwise communicate 
with Plaintiffs' counsel regarding the proposed Stipulation and Order. CR. 141 at H 13. 
9. Defendants' counsel did not provide a copy of a final Stipulation and Order of 
Dismissal Without Prejudice to Plaintiffs' counsel prior to submitting it to the Court for 
signing and entry. Id. at 11 14. 
10. Defendants' counsel did not provide Plaintiffs' counsel "with an executed 
copy" of the Stipulation and Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice as requested in the 
letter of transmittal. Id. at H 15. 
11. Plaintiffs' counsel expected to receive a copy of the Court's Order so he 
could calendar the matter to comply with the one year statute of limitations. CR. 150. 
12. Defendants' counsel did not file with the Clerk of the Court and serve on 
Plaintiffs' counsel or his clients a Notice of Entry of Order of Dismissal Without 
Prejudice. CR. 141 at H 16. 
13. The Stipulation and Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice which was mailed 
by Plaintiffs' counsel to Defendants' counsel on September 4, 1991, as aforesaid, and 
which bears the signatures of Defendants' counsel and the Court was signed by the judge. 
The Order was entered on September 16, 1991. CR. 112. 
14. Plaintiffs' counsel did not know that Defendants' counsel had signed the 
Stipulation or that the Order had been signed or entered until after November 24, 1992, 
1
 See Addendum for a copy of this letter. 
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following inquiry by Plaintiff, Janice Rounds, as to the status of her case. CR. 142 at 11 
18. 
15. On December 22, 1992, Plaintiffs' counsel explained the foregoing to 
Defendants' counsel and requested that he stipulate that the Order of Dismissal Without 
Prejudice be vacated. Id. at 1f 19. 
16. On December 24, 1992, Defendants' counsel advised Plaintiffs' counsel that 
his clients would not authorize him to so stipulate. Id. at 11 20. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' legal counsel specifically requested in his letter to Defendants' legal 
counsel that Defendants' legal counsel provide him with an executed copy of the Order 
of Dismissal. Mr. Orton, Plaintiffs' legal counsel, did not receive a copy of the entry of 
the order. Because of this, he did not know the beginning date of the one-year statute of 
limitations for filing a new complaint. Plaintiffs did not learn of the entry of the order 
until it was too late to file because of the one-year statute of limitations.2 Rule 58A of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-504(4) of the Utah Code of 
Administration require Defendants to give Plaintiffs' legal counsel notice of the entry of 
the Order of Dismissal; therefore, the trial court's failure to grant Plaintiffs' motion 
requesting relief from the Order of Dismissal under the facts of this matter institute an 
abuse of discretion. This court should remand the case to the trial court, ore ng ti t 
the effective date of the trial court's Order of Dismissal be November 24, 199. lit s 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1974). 
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the day that Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' legal counsel became aware that the Order of 
Dismissal had been entered. 
The District Court adopted Defendants' arguments in its ruling below.3 
Defendants argued below they were under no obligation to provide notice of entry of 
order or proof of service pursuant to Rules 4-504(4) and U.R.C.P. 58A because they 
were not "prevailing parties". Defendants further argued that Plaintiffs' Motion was not a 
proper Rule 60(b)(7) motion, that no compelling grounds justifying relief existed, and 
that Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief was not timely filed. 
Appellants will show that Defendants were, in fact, prevailing parties and, 
therefore, had an obligation under both U.R.C.P. 58A and Rule 4-504(4) to provide 
notice of entry of order. It will also be shown that regardless of their status as a 
prevailing party, Defendants assumed the obligations set forth in Rule 4-504(4) to 
provide notice of entry of order and file proof of service. Because Defendants had failed 
to comply with the rules, relief from judgment was warranted. 
The District Court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs relief. Plaintiffs' 
Motion was timely and properly brought under U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7). Further, compelling 
grounds existed justifying the relief sought in light of Defendants' failure to provide 
notice of entry of order and the specific request by Plaintiffs' counsel for such notice. 
Finally, substantial justice and equity demand that Defendants not derive a benefit from 
their own failure to follow applicable rules. 
3
 Because the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion without a memorandum decision and 
adopted the Defendants' reasoning, Plaintiffs will refer to Defendants' arguments with 
the understanding that they were the grounds for the Court's decision. 
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On appeal, Plaintiffs seek reversal of the District Court's decision denying them 
relief from the Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice which was entered in the matter on 
September 16, 1991, but which, through the failure of Defendants to comply with the 
applicable procedural rules, deprived Plaintiffs of actual notice of the entry of the Order 
until after November 24, 1992. Each of Defendants' arguments against granting the 
relief Plaintiffs' requested and the District Court's adoption thereof, are clearly erroneous 
and not properly founded.4 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. DEFENDANTS FAILED TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF ENTRY OF 
ORDER AND FILE PROOF OF SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY RULE 
58A OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RULE 4-
504(4) OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
It is undisputed in the record below that Defendants did not provide notice of 
entry of order to Plaintiffs. Proof of such notice is made by filing proof of service with 
the Court. The record below shows that no proof of service was filed. See supra 
Statement of Facts, no. 11. The initial question to be resolved by this Court is whether 
Defendants were required to provide notice of entry of order and file proof of service 
with the Court under U.R.C.P. 58A and/or Rule 4-504(4). 
4
 Additionally, the district court made no findings. The judgment should "follow 
logically from and be supported by the evidence." The judgment "should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 
1987). 
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1. Utah R. Civ. P. 58A Required Defendants to Provide Notice of 
Entry of Order and File Proof of Service. 
Defendants argued below that the notice requirement of U.R.C.P. 58A did not 
apply because they were not "prevailing parties" within the meaning of the rule. See CR. 
162. Defendants' argument and the District Court's reliance thereon are contrary to law 
and the facts of the case, constituting clear error and warranting reversal. 
U.R.C.P. 58A(d) provides: 
Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The prevailing party 
shall promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment 
to all other parties and shall file proof of service of such 
notice with the clerk of the court. However, the time for 
filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice 
requirement of this provision. 
A stipulation and order dismissing an action without prejudice constitutes a judgment of 
the rendering court. Gardner v. A.H. Robbins Co., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984). 
Because the Stipulation and Order in this case is a "judgment", U.R.C.P. 58A applies. 
Therefore, there must necessarily be a prevailing party, at least for purposes of the 
obligation to provide notice of entry of order and file proof of service under the rule. In 
most cases the prevailing party is determined by the facts and circumstances of the case. 
Otherwise, the rule would be inapplicable to any matter in which the court did not 
designate a prevailing party. 
In this case, Defendants brought a Motion to Dismiss the case for Plaintiffs 
failure to provide a non-resident cost bond. CR. 104-107. After discussions between 
counsel, a stipulation for dismissal was agreed to. Defendants objective of obtaining a 
dismissal by bringing the Motion to Dismiss was, therefore, realized. Defendants then 
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prepared the first stipulation and transmitted it to Plaintiffs for signature. Clearly, 
Defendants assumed the position of a prevailing party in form and substance by bringing 
the motion, obtaining a dismissal and presenting the Order to the Court. By "prevailing 
on the main issue," Defendants were prevailing parties and required to provide notice of 
entry of order and file proof of service pursuant to U.R.C.P. 58A. Cf. CR. 162. It is 
undisputed that they failed to do so. 
2. Defendants Failed to Provide Notice of Entry of Order and 
Proof of Service as Required by Rule 4-504(4) of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration. 
Defendants argued below that, as with U.R.C.P. 58A, only a prevailing party is 
required to provide notice of entry of order and proof of service under Rule 4-504(4) of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. This contention is unsupported by authority, 
is contrary to the plain language of the rule and contravenes the basic policy behind 
notice requirements. It would further be inequitable in view of Plaintiffs' request that 
Defendants provide an executed copy of the order after it was signed by the judge. 
Rule 4-504(4) provides: 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment 
shall be served upon the opposing party and proof of such 
service shall be filed with the court. All judgments, orders, 
and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted 
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence 
requiring a reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed 
envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
A stipulation and order dismissing an action without prejudice constitutes a judgment of 
the rendering court. Gardner v. A.H. Robbins Co., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984). In 
this case there was a judgment entered. According to the rule, upon the entry of the 
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judgment notice shall be served on the opposing party. Defendants stated they were not 
the prevailing party. As demonstrated above, they were the prevailing party. 
Furthermore, a more logical reading of the more broadly worded Rule indicates that the 
party who submits the order for signature, whether prevailing or not, must serve the 
notice on the "opposing party". See 4-504(4). This reading is more consistent with the 
language of the rule and common sense, i.e. the party causing the judgment to be 
entered is the party responsible for giving notice of its entry to the opposing party. 
Additionally, the Rule's language specifically deals with an "opposing party" rather 
than the "prevailing party". The Rule was intended to encompass stipulations as well as 
judgments on the merits. This is evidenced by the placement of subsection (4) after 
subsection (2) and (3). Rule 4-504(4) applies to judgments regardless of whether they are 
the result of a stipulation (4-504(3)) or a decision on the merits (4-504(2)). If the notice 
requirements of 4-504(4) applied only to Rule 4-504(2), the rule would have specified 
that 4-504(4) applied only to judgments under 4-504(2) instead of constituting a separate 
subsection following (3) which deals specifically with stipulations. 
Moreover, the policy underlying the adoption of the notice requirements of 4-
504(4) also supports a reading that the party undertaking the obligation of presenting the 
order for signature must also provide notice of its entry and file proof of service with the 
court. As the Court of Appeals stated in Workman v. Nagle Construction, 802 P.2d 749 
(Utah App. 1990), stated, "the purpose and intended effect of the Utah and federal rules 
are the same, namely, notice that a judgment has been entered." Additionally, the Utah 
Supreme Court has indicated that the District Court Rules and Circuit Court Rules (now 
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the Code of Judicial Administration) are supplemental to the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Bigelow v. Ingersoll. 618 P.2d 50, 52 (Utah 1980). 
Therefore, whether technically a prevailing party or not, Defendants undertook 
the obligation to present the Stipulation and Order to the Court for signature and entry. 
Therefore, they were required by the Rule to provide notice of entry of order and file 
proof of service with the Court. Defendants failed to do so. In light of their failure to 
comply with the notice requirements of the Rule, Plaintiffs Motion for Relief must be 
granted. 
B. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief requested that the September 16, 1991, Order be 
deemed filed as of the day they acquired actual notice of the entry of order, namely, 
November 24, 1992. Defendants, argued that Plaintiffs' Motion was actually an untimely 
60(b)(1) motion founded upon attorney error, that no compelling grounds existed to 
justify relief. The following will show that each of Defendants' arguments is clearly 
erroneous and the District Court's reliance on them constitutes plain error and resulted 
in an abuse of discretion. 
1. Defendants Failure to Provide Notice of Entry of Order 
Deprived Plaintiffs of Notice and Justifies U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7) 
Relief. 
A request for relief from the operation of a stipulated judgment is properly 
addressed by a Rule 60(b) motion. See Moore's Federal Practice, H60.27[2], and 
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accompanying authority.5 Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
relevant part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in 
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: . . . 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered 
or taken. . . . 
In this case Defendants' first argument for denying Plaintiffs' Motion was that Rule 
60(b)(7) was inapplicable. Defendants' memorandum, adopted as the District Court's 
reasoning, stated that Plaintiffs' Motion was based on "attorney inadvertence or neglect 
and falls within Rule 60 (b)(1)". CR. 159. Defendants, thereafter, argued that failure of 
Plaintiffs' counsel to request relief for over fourteen months was outside of the three 
month limit imposed by U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). Id. However, the neglect which caused the 
fourteen month delay in requesting relief in this case was the result of the omission of 
Defendants' counsel in failing to provide notice of entry of order rather than any alleged 
neglect on the part of Plaintiffs' counsel for failing to receive the notice of entry of the 
order. 
Furthermore, even assuming Defendants were under no obligation to provide 
notice of entry or proof of service, the failure of an attorney to act is seen by federal 
5
 In the absence of controlling state court decisions, the courts of this State will look 
to federal decisions addressing similar rules of civil procedure for guidance. Winegar v. 
Slim Olson. Inc.. 252 P.2d 205 (Utah 1953). 
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courts as coming within the "any other reason" provisions of Federal Rule 60(b)(6), which 
is identical to Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules, and must be brought within a reasonable 
time. See Moore's Federal Practice. 1160-286, at n.41, 42. Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief 
was, therefore, properly grounded in U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7). 
2. Compelling Grounds Existed for Relief from the Judgment or 
Order. 
Defendants' failure to file and serve the required notices, as aforesaid, has been 
prejudicial to Plaintiffs. The Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice operated to trigger 
U.C.A. §78-12-40, giving Plaintiffs one year from the date of the "failure" of their action 
to refile. The purpose of this law is to permit potentially valid suits to be heard which 
may otherwise be barred if they are dismissed without prejudice after the applicable 
statute of limitations has run. Marsden v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). 
Under the September 16, 1991, Order, the one year refiling period expired on 
September 16, 1992. However, Plaintiffs did not even discover that the Order of 
Dismissal Without Prejudice dated September 16, 1991, had been entered until after 
November 24, 1992. Defendants' failure to provide Plaintiffs with the required notice 
served to hinder refiling of a Complaint by the widow and minor son of David W. 
Rounds of their action until after the period provided by said statute expired. The 
prejudice of being deprived of their action is self-evident. 
It is a rule of equity that a party not be allowed to benefit from his own improper 
or dilatory conduct or that of his legal counsel. See Dutton v. Rocky Mountain 
Phosphates, 438 P.2d 674 (Mont. 1968); 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity, §§138 & 147. Here, if 
Defendants are allowed to avoid their duty to provide notice as required by the Rules 
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and thereby derive a benefit by preventing the opposing party from having his day in 
court, justice will be circumvented. Equity demands that Defendants' conduct not be 
rewarded. As the Court in Dutton, stated: 
Relief will be granted when, in view of all the circumstances, 
to deny it would permit one of the parties to suffer a gross 
wrong at the hands of the other party who brought about the 
condition. 
Dutton, 438 P.2d at 684. 
The District Court's failure to grant Plaintiffs the relief requested improperly permitted 
Defendants to derive a benefit from their improper actions thereby constituting an abuse 
of discretion and warranting reversal. 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief was Timely Presented Pursuant 
to U.RA.P. 60(b)(7). 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Workman v. Nagle Construction, 802 P.2d 749 
(Utah App. 1990), stated that "if a losing party has remained ignorant of a judgment in 
part because the prevailing party has not complied with Rule 58A(d), the resulting delay 
is more reasonable for purposes of Rule 60(b)(5) through (7).,f Id. at 250. The 
Workman Court further held that the defendant's 60(b) motion was timely because the 
motion for relief was brought approximately one month after discovery of the entry of 
the order. Id. Finally, the Court stated, "while noncompliance with those rules does not 
bring about automatic invalidity of an entered judgment, it is a weighty factor in 
determining the timeliness of later challenges to the judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 
60(b)(5)-(7)." Workman. 802 P.2d at 750. 
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In this case, as in Workman, Plaintiffs were not served with any notice of entry of 
order. See supra Statement of Facts no. 11. Moreover, Plaintiffs' Motion was brought 
within two months after actual discovery of entry of the Order, on January 15, 1993. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order was properly and timely 
before the Court for consideration pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7). The Court's holding 
to the contrary constitutes clear error and warrants reversal. 
C. THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS 
RELIEF BECAUSE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ORDER 
WAS TOLLED UNTIL PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED ACTUAL 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF THE ORDER. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that the rules requiring the prevailing party 
to provide notice of entry pursuant to Rule 58A(d) or Rule 4-504 are not "inert 
desiderata" although the judgment is nonetheless "effective". Workman, 802 P.2d at 752. 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of failure to provide notice of entry of 
order only once, finding harmless error had occurred. Mountain States Tel. & Tel, v. 
Sohm, 755 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has, however, stated of 
the earlier procedural rules: 
Practical considerations and fairness in appellate 
procedure support this conclusion. Prior to promulgation of 
Rule 2.9(b), counsel were obliged to constantly check with the 
court clerk to determine whether a judgment had been filed. 
On occasion, because of the press of other business and the 
lack of notice, filing dates were missed and what may have 
been meritorious appeals, dismissed. The District Court and 
Circuit Court Rules were designed in part to obviate this 
problem. Proper effectuation of both rules requires that Rule 
2.9(b) of the District and Circuit Court Rules be read 
together with Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Bigelow v. Ingersoll 618 P.2d 50, 52-53 (Utah 1980). 
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Under Rule 5 8 A, the only time period which is not specifically tolled pending 
receipt of notice of entry of an order is the period for filing a notice of appeal. U.R.C.P. 
58A(d). This express reservation indicates, by negative implication, that a failure to 
provide notice of entry of judgment or order will toll the accrual of effective date of the 
Judgment for other purposes. Otherwise, Rule 58A(d) would simply have provided that 
no periods are tolled pending filing and service of notice of entry of order. Interestingly, 
if no periods were tolled pending filing and service of notice of entry, Rule 58A(d) and 
Rule 4-504(4) would, in fact, be inert desiderata and have no meaning whatsoever. Cf. 
Workman, at 750. Finally, the Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504(4), does not 
even carve out the notice of appeal exception provided by Rule 58A(d), further 
indicating that tolling of the effective date of the Order is proper until notice thereof is 
provided to the opposing party. 
Justice requires that the Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice be deemed entered 
as of the date Plaintiffs discovered that it had been entered. Giving this effect to the 
Order would preclude Defendants from benefiting from their failure to comply with the 
Rules and, at the same time, would preserve the effectiveness of the Order. Cf. 
Workman, 803 P.2d at 750. In the alternative, the Order should be vacated and set aside 
altogether. 
The fact that notice of entry of order was neither filed nor served herein, as 
required by the Rules, is undisputed. That prejudice has resulted from Defendants' 
omission is also uncontestable. As the Bigelow Court noted, prior to promulgation of the 
Rules: 
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. . . counsel were obliged to constantly check with the court 
clerk to determine whether a judgment had been filed. On 
occasion, because of the press of other business and the lack 
of notice, filing dates were missed and what may have been 
meritorious appeals, dismissed. The District Court and 
Circuit Court Rules were designed in part to obviate this 
problem. . . . 
The District Court erred in its application of the Rules to the facts of this case, 
warranting reversal of the Court's Order denying Plaintiffs relief. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs seek relief from the Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice which was 
entered on September 16, 1991, but which they did not discover was entered until after 
November 24, 1992. They have demonstrated that Defendants failed to provide notice of 
entry of Order as required by the Rules and as requested by Plaintiffs' counsel, nor did 
they file proof of service with the court. Plaintiffs have shown that their Motion for 
Relief From Judgment or Order was timely and that compelling grounds existed justifying 
the relief requested. Plaintiffs have further shown that the effectiveness of the judgment 
can be preserved while affording the requested relief. Finally, justice requires 
Defendants not be permitted to benefit from their failure to comply with the applicable 
Rules. 
The District Court clearly abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs' request for 
relief in light of Defendants' failure to observe the applicable rules and the other facts 
favoring the relief requested. Plaintiffs should be given relief from the Order of 
Dismissal Without Prejudice in the form of an order declaring that said Order be set 
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aside or, alternatively, that it be deemed entered as of the date Plaintiffs actually became 
aware of its entry. 
Respectfully submitted this_26jHday of July, 1993. 
ROBERTT.X)RTONf #A£483 
MILO a MARSDEN,\IR/- #2086 
MARSDEN^ORTON, CAHOON & 
GOTTFREDSON 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
MILO S. MARSDEN, JR. - #2086 
ROBERT F.ORTON - #A2483 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON 
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
I, flflSfY\ certify that on I served copies of the 
attached BRIEF OF APPELLANTS upon the following counsel for the 
Defendants/Appellees in this matter by mailing it to them by first class mail with 
sufficient postage prepaid to the following addresses: 
REED M. STRINGHAM, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant, State of Utah 
Department of Transportation 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84U4 
MILO S. MARSDEN 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
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LAW OFFICES 
M A R S D E N , ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTTREDSON 
F I F T H F L O O R 
M.LO s. MAASOCN. JR. 6 8 S O U T H M A I N 
BOBCWT r ORTON. PC S A L T I i A K E C I T Y , U T A H 8 4 1 0 1 or COUNSEL 
MICMACL oorrrwcosoN ( 8 0 I ) 5 2 I - 3 S O O RCNOCU. N. MA«CY 
RICMAAO C. CAMOON. P C. 
FAX (80 I ) 537-1315 
September 4, 1991 
Reed M. Stringham III 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Rounds vs. State of Utah and Utah 
Department of Transportation 
Dear Reed: 
I am enclosing a revised Stipulation and Order of Dismissal 
Without Prejudice. If you are in agreement with the changes, 
please present the Order to the Court for signing and entry and 
provide me with an executed copy thereof. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Very truly yours 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
RFO:kdm 
Enclosure 
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
REED M. STRINGHAM - 4679 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANICE ROUNDS and DYLAN 
ROUNDS, 
Plaintiffs, 
STATE OF UTAH, and UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM 
OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR 
ORDER 
Civil No. 900902566PI 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
This is the memorandum of defendants State of Utah and 
Utah Department of Transportation (collectively "UDOT") opposing 
plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment or order. 
FACTS 
In addition to the facts submitted by plaintiffs, UDOT 
submits the following: 
1. On June 20 and 21, 1991 respectively, counsel for 
UDOT filed two motions: a motion to compel plaintiffs to provide 
sufficient answers to interrogatories that had been served on 
r\ i\ r\ 
August 20, 1990; and a motion to dismiss without prejudice 
because plaintiffs failed to file the undertaking required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19. Affidavit of Reed Stringham. 
2. Plaintiffs did not respond to the motions, so on 
July 15, 1991 the motions were submitted for decision. Id. 
3. On or about July 18, 1991, UDOT's counsel agreed to 
allow plaintiffs until August 15, 1991 to respond to the motions. 
Id. 
4. Sometime after August 15, 1991 but before September 
3, 1991, plaintiffs' counsel called UDOT's counsel and said that 
plaintiffs would stipulate to dismissal without prejudice if UDOT 
would withdraw its motion to compel. UDOT's counsel agreed, 
prepared a stipulation and order and had it delivered to 
plaintiffs' counsel on September 3, 1991 for approval. A copy of 
the proposed stipulation is contained at Exhibit A to the 
Affidavit of Robert F. Orton in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Relief From Judgment or Order. Id. 
5. On September 6, 1991, UDOT's counsel received in 
the mail from plaintiffs' counsel a court paper titled 
"Stipulation and Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice." UDOT's 
counsel reviewed it and signed it on that day. Id. 
6. The substance of the stipulation and order prepared 
by plaintiffs' counsel is identical to one proposed earlier by 
UDOT's counsel. UDOT's proposed stipulation and order states: 
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STIPULATION 
The parties, through their respective counsel, 
stipulate that this action be dismissed without prejudice, each 
party to bear their own costs, and that defendant's motion to 
compel be withdrawn. 
ORDER 
Based on the stipulation of the parties, and good cause 
appearing therefor, this action is dismissed without prejudice, 
each party to bear their own costs, and defendant's motion to 
compel is withdrawn. 
The stipulation and order prepared by plaintiffs' 
counsel states: 
STIPULATION 
The parties, through their respective counsel, 
stipulate and agree: 
1. That Defendants' Motion to Dismiss may be granted 
provided that the dismissal shall not be on the merits and shall 
be without prejudice. 
2. That Defendants' Motion to Compel may be withdrawn. 
3. That the parties shall bear their own costs of 
suit. 
ORDER 
Based on the Stipulation of the parties, and good cause 
appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That Defendants' Motion to Compel be and the same 
is hereby ordered withdrawn. 
2. That Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be and th ame 
is hereby granted and Plaintiffs' Complaint be and is hereby 
dismissed; provided, however, that said dismissal is not a 
dismissal on the merits and is without prejudice. 
3. That the parties bear their own costs of suit. 
See Exhibits to Orton's Affidavit. 
7. After signing the stipulation, UDOT's counsel 
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handed it to his secretary and told her to send the original to 
the court and to mail a copy of it to plaintiff's counsel. 
Stringham Affidavit. 
8. It is not known whether a copy was mailed to 
plaintiff's counsel. UDOT's counsel did not follow up with his 
secretary to make sure she sent a copy to plaintiff's counsel. 
However, it has been UDOT's counsel's experience that his 
secretary follows his instructions and mails papers that he asks 
her to mail. Id. 
9. Plaintiffs did not conduct any discovery from the 
filing of the lawsuit until the dismissal of the action on 
September 16, 1991. Plaintiffs did not thereafter attempt to 
prosecute the case. Id. 
PLAINTIFFS1 BURDEN OF PROOF 
Plaintiffs have moved for relief from judgment pursuant 
to Rule 60(b)(7), Utah R. Civ. P. The rule gives the court 
discretionary authority to relieve a party from a final judgment 
for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment." Id. In order to prevail on a Rule 60(b)(7) motion, a 
party must demonstrate the following: 
1. the reason for relief must be one other than those 
listed in Rule 60(b)(1) - (6); 
2. the reason justifies relief from judgment; 
3. the motion is made in a reasonable time. 
Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n.. 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 
1982) . 
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ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION DOES NOT 
SATISFY RULE 60(b)(7) 
Plaintiffs cannot establish the elements of a motion 
under Rule 60(b)(7). Their proferred reason for relief, that 
they did not receive notice of the judgment, is based if anything 
on attorney inadvertence or neglect and falls within Rule 
60(b)(1). Moreover, the reason does not justify relief from 
judgment because plaintiffs' counsel, having drafted the 
stipulation and order of dismissal, fully intended it to be 
signed and entered. There can be no claim of prejudice when 
plaintiffs did nothing for over fourteen months to attempt to 
prosecute the case or inquire as to the status of the order their 
attorney drafted. Finally, plaintiffs' sixteen month delay in 
bringing the motion for relief is not reasonable. 
A. Proffered Justification Falls Within Rule 60(b)(1) 
Rule 60(b)(1) permits relief from judgment where there 
is "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." Where 
attorney neglect is the proffered reason for relief, Utah's 
appeals courts apply Rule 60(b)(1). See Annotations to Rule 
60(b)(1) in Utah Court Rules Ann. pp. 197, 201-202 (1992). 
Federal courts also have "frequently" held that cases of attorney 
neglect fall within the identical Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) rather 
than the federal version of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(7). C. Wright 
& A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2864 p. 222 (1973). 
In the present case, plaintiffs received tardy notice 
of the dismissal as a result of attorney neglect. Plaintiffs' 
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counsel drafted the stipulation and order for dismissal and 
approved the order as to form. He sent it to defense counsel in 
September 1991 with the intent that it would be signed and 
entered. When he did not hear from defense counsel, plaintiffs' 
attorney made no inquiry. He did nothing in the case for the 
next fourteen months until November, 1992 when, upon inquiry by 
plaintiffs, he investigated and discovered that the order of 
dismissal had been entered on September 16, 1991. This is 
neglect, if anything, and falls within Rule 60(b)(1). It is not 
"any other reason justifying relief." Plaintiffs cannot 
establish the first element of their motion. 
B. Reason Does Not Justify Relief 
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to relief 
because they did not receive notice of the dismissal. According 
to them, UDOT was required by local Rule 4-504(2) to provide a 
copy of the proposed judgment to plaintiffs prior to its 
presentment to the court. Also according to plaintiffs, UDOT was 
required to provide notice of entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 
4-504(4), C.J.A., and Rule 58A, Utah R. Civ. P. Since 
plaintiffs' counsel never received either notice, they conclude 
that the judgment was never filed and is therefore invalid. 
Plaintiffs' argument errs because Rule 4-504(2) does 
not apply. It governs the procedure for submitting orders based 
on judicial determinations of disputed issues. A different rule 
applies where there is a stipulated dismissal. Rule 4-504(3) 
states: 
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(3) Stipulated settlements and 
dismissals shall also be reduced in writing 
and presented to the court for signature 
within fifteen days of the settlement and 
dismissal. 
The rule does not say anything about serving a stipulation before 
presentment to the court. Thus, UDOT was not required by local 
rule to send a copy of the stipulation back to plaintiffs' 
counsel. 
The reason for a different local rule for stipulated 
dismissals is clear. Parties to a stipulation are both fully 
aware of what is occurring in their case, each having reached an 
agreement and having executed the stipulation. There is no need 
for further notice to a party who has drafted and signed a 
stipulation and approved an order as to form, especially when 
there is no question that the stipulation will be signed because 
its substance is identical to one previously drafted by the 
opposing party. In this case, therefore, plaintiffs received 
sufficient notice of the stipulation and order before it was 
presented to the court. 
The decision in Biaelow \ Inaersoll. 618 P.2d 580 
(Utah 1980) is not to the contrary. In Biaelow the court held 
that an opposing party must be served with a copy of a proposed 
order before it is presented to the judge. The purpose of th 3 
rule is to notify the opposing party that a judgment has been 
filed. However, Biaelow involved a judicial determination of 
disputed issues rather than a stipulated dismissal. The 
controlling local rule in Bigelow simply does not apply here 
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because in this case there is no rule requiring service of a 
stipulated order of dismissal prior to presentment to the court. 
Plaintiffs here had adequate notice, as demonstrated above, so 
Biaelow is distinguishable. 
Plaintiffs also incorrectly contend that the judgment 
is invalid because they did not receive notice of entry of 
judgment. Rule 58A(d) requires "prevailing parties" to give 
notice. A prevailing party is one who "successfully prosecutes 
the action or successfully defends against it, prevailing on the 
main issue." Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951). Since the 
stipulation in the present case was for dismissal without 
prejudice, defendants are not prevailing parties and had no 
obligation under the rules to give notice. In any event, Utah 
Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs' argument in Workman v. 
Nacrle Construction Co.. 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990) . In Nacrle. 
the plaintiff did not give notice of entry of judgment and the 
defendants argued that this omission invalidated the judgment. 
The court rejected the argument holding that "[njotice to the 
parties of the entry of judgment was therefore not a prerequisite 
to its effectiveness." Ic|. at 751. 
Additionally, Rule 4-504(4) does not help plaintiffs' 
cause. The rule requires that notice of entry of judgment be 
served on "the opposing party." However, it does not say who is 
to serve notice. Given that omission, it is logical to assume 
that the "prevailing party" has the obligation as required by 
Rule 58A. UDOT is not a prevailing party, as shown above, and 
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therefore has no obligation to give notice. 
Finally, plaintiffs wrongly suggest that they are 
unfairly prejudiced. It was plaintiffs who initially proposed a 
dismissal and had their attorney draft a stipulation and order to 
that effect. Their attorney signed the stipulation, approved it 
as to form and sent it to defense counsel for his signature. 
Since the proposed stipulation was substantively identical to one 
that UDOT proposed earlier, it is no surprise that UDOT agreed to 
it. UDOT's counsel then instructed his secretary to send an 
executed copy to plaintiff's counsel, but he never received it. 
Nevertheless, instead of asking abut the stipulation or 
attempting to prosecute the case, plaintiffs did nothing for the 
next fourteen months. It is unreasonable for plaintiffs to claim 
unfair prejudice on these facts. They certainly did not wait 
fourteen months expecting UDOT's counsel to respond to the 
proposed stipulation. Rather, they simply failed to follow 
through on a matter they set in motion. The Rule 60(b) policy 
announced by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Binder 
Robinson & Co. v. U.S.S.C.C, 748 F.2d 1415, 1421 (10th Cir. 
1984) is equally applicable here: 
Keeping the suit alive merely because the 
plaintiff should not be penalized for the 
omissions of his own attorney would be 
visiting the sins of the plaintiff's lawyer 
upon the defendant. (emphasis original) 
(quoting Link v. Wabash Railroad. 370 U.S. 626, 634 n. 10 
(1962) .) 
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C. Unreasonable Period of Time 
Plaintiffs cannot establish that their motion for 
relief is made within a reasonable time. They set in motion the 
events leading to the dismissal. They had an entire year to 
inquire about the stipulation and did nothing. If they had 
attempted to prosecute the action during that year they would 
have learned of the dismissal. The fact that they did not get an 
executed copy of the stipulation and order is unfortunate, but 
that is not an important factor because the requirements of the 
local rules and Rule 58A, Utah R. Civ. P., do not apply to 
stipulated dismissals. Therefore, plaintiffs' motion for relief 
from judgment is not filed in a reasonable time. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule 
60(b)(7). Their motion for relief from judgment should be 
denied. 
DATED this 2.-7 day of January, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
REED M. STRDjttGHAM III 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER, this J? day of 
January, 1993, to the following: 
Robert F. Orton 
Milo S. Marsden 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON 
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
\Q^ <3cJc/r>/c/ 
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
REED M. STRINGHAM - 4679 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANICE ROUNDS, and DYLAN 
ROUNDS, : AFFIDAVIT OF REED M. 
: STRINGHAM 
Plaintiffs, 
v. : 
STATE OF UTAH, and UTAH : 
DEPARTMENT OF : 
TRANSPORTATION, : Civil No. 900902566 PI 
Defendants. : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Reed Stringham being sworn states: 
1. I am the attorney for the defendants in this 
action. I have personal knowledge of the facts in this affidavit 
and am competent to testify to them. 
2. On June 20 and 21, 1991 respectively, I filed on 
behalf of defendants two motions: a motion to compel plaintiffs 
to provide sufficient answers to interrogatories that had been 
served on August 20, 1990; and a motion to dismiss without 
v^ ~*> ^» * 
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prejudice because plaintiffs failed to file the undertaking 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19. 
3. Plaintiffs did not respond to the motions, so on 
July 15, 1991 the motions were submitted for decision. 
4. On or about July 18, 1991 I agreed to allow 
plaintiffs until August 15, 1991 to respond to the motions. 
5. Sometime after August 15, 1991 but before September 
3, 1991, plaintiffs' counsel called me and said that plaintiffs 
would stipulate to dismissal without prejudice if defendants 
would withdraw their motion to compel. I agreed, prepared a 
stipulation and order and had it delivered to plaintiffs' counsel 
on September 3, 1991 for his approval. A copy of the proposed 
stipulation is contained at Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Robert 
F. Orton m Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief From 
Judgment or Order. 
6. On September 6, 1991, I received in the mail from 
plaintiffs' counsel a court paper titled "Stipulation and Order 
of Dismissal Without Prejudice.11 I reviewed it and signed it on 
that day. 
7. After signing the stipulation I handed it to my 
secretary and told her to send the original to the court and to 
mail a copy of it to plaintiffs' counsel. 
8. I do not know whether a copy was mailed to 
plaintiffs' counsel. I did not follow up with my secretary to 
make sure she sent a copy to plaintiffs' counsel. However, it 
has been my experience that my secretary follows my instructions 
and mails papers that I ask her to mail. 
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9. Plaintiffs did not conduct any discovery from the 
filing of the lawsuit until the dismissal of the action on 
September 16, 1991. Plaintiffs did not attempt to move the case 
forward after that date. 
DATED this ^ <** day of January, 1993. 
REED M. STRIN9HAM III 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this *?£ day of 
January, 1993. 
Notary Public , ^ / * 
ETTYSCHORELD I (, < ^C yf / 
•" MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF REED STRINGHAM, this c?7 day of 
January, 1993, to the following: 
Robert F. Orton 
Milo S. Marsden 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON 
68 South Main Street 
Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City# Utah 84101 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROUNDS, JANICE 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPT OF TRANSPO DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 900902566 PI 
DATE 02/22/93 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CLB 
TYPE OF HEARINGS 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 19, 1993, THE 
COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, ETC. IS 
DENIED, FOR THE REASONS STATED IN DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION. 
2. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT TO PREPARE THE APPROPRIATE 
ORDER. 
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
REED M. STRINGHAM - 4679 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 575-1650 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANICE ROUNDS and DYLAN 
ROUNDS, : ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
: RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, : 
v. : 
: Civil No. 900902566PI 
STATE OF UTAH, and UTAH : 
DEPARTMENT OF : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
TRANS PORTATION, : 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment or 
Order. The parties filed supporting and opposing memoranda and 
affidavits and the motion was submitted for decision on February 
19, 1993. The Court denied the motion for the reasons stated in 
its February 22, 1993 Minute Entry. 
- ;ist 
r.3 9 1393 
A SALTJ^KE COUNTY 
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IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from 
Judgment is denied. .. / 
DATED this 4 4 ^ day of E«JM=»etty, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
UOmlU&LEjJ J DENNIS FREDERICK 
D^ scTictr~ccAirt Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
Of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, 
this <PB day of February, 1993, to the following: 
Robert F. Orton 
Milo S. Marsden 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON 
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
//M&^ 
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